Autonomy
Challenges
- Safety constraints must hold across changing environments and long-running tasks.
- Human intent can become difficult to trace through layered autonomous decisions.
- Protocol failures may emerge only after rare sequences of otherwise valid actions.
- System updates must preserve established guarantees and operating boundaries.
Problems We Solve
- Invariant Modeling Represent safety boundaries and operating assumptions explicitly.
- Protocol Checking Check transitions, permissions, and required responses.
- Failure Simulation Explore exceptional paths before they occur in operation.
- Boundary Validation Detect actions that leave an approved operating envelope.
- Evidence Generation Produce traceable records for review and assurance.
Domain portfolio
Application patterns
Compare two formal-assurance approaches, then explore the domain workflows as interactive state machines.
01 Uncrewed aircraft contingency-protocol authoring Explore pattern
System/use case
Operational setting
Decision/claim boundary
Candidate checked statements
Illustrative controlled-English propositions for a future UAS setup include:
- “Every transition from normal navigation after confirmed command-link loss enters a declared contingency mode.”
- “No permitted contingency transition commands a waypoint outside the active containment region.”
- “Pilot override remains permitted in every engaged autonomous flight mode.”
These are candidate schemas, not statements that the current tool or a deployed UAS already implements or proves.
Example architecture
mayTransition and overridePermitted. FF Scribe runs off the operational network and records candidates, diagnostics, readings, and decisions. A requirements repository versions accepted propositions; simulation, test, hazard analysis, and approval remain independent evidence channels. A human controls acceptance and requirements changes.Where verified readback fits
ff-readback produces a finite, audited deterministic family with semantic-rule provenance; unsupported structure fails visibly without a partial reading. The reviewer explicitly accepts the intended reading or supplies feedback for another bounded pass. Compilation alone does not establish an assurance claim.Potential benefits
Limits/adoption considerations
02 Warehouse autonomous-mobile-robot traffic coordination Explore pattern
System/use case
Operational setting
Decision/claim boundary
Candidate checked statements
Possible controlled-English propositions include:
- “If one robot owns a conflict-zone reservation, every other robot is denied entry to that zone.”
- “Every blocked mission can transition either to a cleared route or to operator assistance.”
- “A robot in protective stop cannot receive a motion-authorizing dispatch transition.”
- “Releasing a transfer-point reservation requires completion or cancellation of the associated handoff.”
These illustrate a potential domain setup; they are not deployed fleet rules or current readback coverage claims.
Example architecture
Where verified readback fits
Potential benefits
Limits/adoption considerations
03 Automated-driving fallback and minimal-risk transition review Explore pattern
System/use case
Operational setting
Decision/claim boundary
Candidate checked statements
Potential controlled-English propositions include:
- “Every confirmed exit from the active operational design domain initiates fallback while the feature is engaged.”
- “Driver override is permitted from every automated lateral-control state.”
- “A severe degradation cannot transition directly to normal automated operation without recovery confirmation.”
- “Every unresolved takeover request progresses to a declared minimal-risk transition.”
They are illustrative formalization targets, not verified properties of any driving system.
Example architecture
Where verified readback fits
ff-readback translation either realizes a supported checked type through its finite, audited family—retaining premise order and scoped entities—or reports unsupported structure without a reading. The safety engineer compares the deterministic readings with the requirement and accepts only the intended one, or gives feedback that starts another bounded proposal-and-check loop.Potential benefits
Limits/adoption considerations
04 Spacecraft onboard autonomy and safing-sequence assurance Explore pattern
System/use case
Operational setting
Decision/claim boundary
Candidate checked statements
Illustrative propositions for a curated mission setup include:
- “Every confirmed critical power fault transitions either to load shedding or to safing.”
- “A command inhibited by an active fault response cannot be issued by onboard autonomy.”
- “Every autonomous safing entry produces a ground-visible notification state.”
- “Recovery from safing requires both fault-clearance evidence and an authorized recovery event.”
These are proposed statement forms only, not claims about a particular mission or implemented adapter.
Example architecture
Where verified readback fits
ff-readback derives audited deterministic readings while preserving configured constants and premise roles; unsupported structures fail visibly. A qualified practitioner accepts the intended meaning or gives feedback. Confirmation neither approves a flight rule nor uploads a command.Potential benefits
Limits/adoption considerations
Applicability frame
MLTTDB is most plausible here as a design-time or release-time assurance layer for finite, source-controlled configuration sets. Proof-assistant source owns row types, table declarations, invariants, and proofs. The SQLite term store owns ordered source-language records, UUIDs, projection values, language metadata, and discovered table metadata. It can orchestrate verification, but Agda, Lean, or Rocq performs semantic checking. Agda currently supports finite table lookup by literal UUID in stored rows; the Lean and Rocq preprocessors validate generated definitions but do not provide that lookup facility.
Current data mode checks fetched rows as separate definitions; it does not expose a table to application proofs as an enumerable, first-class collection. Whenever an example below claims whole-snapshot coverage, uniqueness, or graph acyclicity, the architecture therefore assumes either a finite domain declared in proof source or an external snapshot compiler that emits a reconciled aggregate manifest/certificate term. The proof assistant checks that aggregate term, while external reconciliation establishes that it represents the table export supplied for release.
Telemetry ingestion, map or world-model construction, identity and access, source-system reconciliation, command dispatch, runtime enforcement, incident handling, and formalization review remain production components outside MLTTDB. A successful proof-assistant run establishes only the properties encoded over the supplied records and assumptions; it does not establish that sensors describe the real world correctly or that a deployed controller implements the checked model.
01 Warehouse AMR mission-release policy pack Explore pattern
Operational context
Why MLTTDB fits
Example architecture
WES/map/fleet exports -> reconciliation + review -> MLTTDB term store
|
proof-owned schema + invariants ---------------------+
v
Agda/Lean/Rocq check
|
signed release report + bundle
v
fleet-manager deployment pipeline
An external adapter normalizes approved WES mission templates, map-zone identifiers, and vendor capability codes into reviewed source-language records. The term store preserves their order, UUIDs, and metadata. A proof-assistant module supplies the domain model and release predicates; CI or the store’s verification endpoint invokes the compatible checker. A separate deployment pipeline correlates the successful report with exact source exports and the fleet-manager bundle.
Representative typed artifacts
RobotProfile, including drive envelope, payload interface, and supported stop or recovery modes.ZonePolicy, with access class, required interface handshake, and permitted mission states.MissionTemplate, referencing a route class, payload class, and required recovery policy; Agda rows may use finite UUID lookup for controlled references to earlier tables.TransitionRuleandFailStateDisposition, separating normal progression from blocked, degraded, and manual-recovery outcomes.- A
ReleaseManifestaggregate term, reconciled to the exported row UUIDs, carrying aReleasablewitness or decidable check over the complete approved pack represented by that term.
Checks and evidence
Potential benefits
Deployment boundary
02 BVLOS inspection-drone contingency-envelope release Explore pattern
Operational context
Why MLTTDB fits
Example architecture
approved ConOps + aircraft config + route design
|
v
domain adapter and accountable review
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MLTTDB policy/configuration database <--- proof-owned flight model
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project CI invokes proof assistant
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assurance dossier + approved profile digest
v
operations planning platform
The adapter resolves identifiers from configuration management, route design, and procedure repositories and produces a candidate baseline. MLTTDB stores proof-language rows; the proof assistant checks their modeled relationships. An assurance service packages results with the exact flight-profile digest. The operations platform accepts only a separately authorized baseline and performs its own current-data and authorization checks.
Representative typed artifacts
AircraftConfiguration, capturing approved propulsion, navigation, C2, and recovery capabilities as abstract capabilities rather than raw telemetry.FlightPhaseandSegmentEnvelope, with permitted modes and declared operational assumptions.ContingencyTrigger,RequiredResponse, andEscalationTargetrecords.RecoverySiteCapabilitylinked to applicable segment and aircraft classes.- A
ContingencyCoverageManifestaggregate term, externally built and reconciled to the profile export, enumerating the phase-trigger pairs, responses, recovery sites, and row UUIDs covered by release checks. - Proof obligations such as trigger coverage, response precondition satisfaction, monotone escalation, and no modeled path to an unhandled terminal state.
Checks and evidence
Potential benefits
Deployment boundary
03 Industrial robotic-cell changeover interlock baseline Explore pattern
Operational context
Why MLTTDB fits
CellBaselineManifest aggregate term
and reconciles its UUID list and digest with the table export. Proofs over that
term can establish structural properties across the represented catalogue:
required interlocks precede hazardous commands in the abstract sequence;
mutually exclusive modes are never demanded together; every abort state has a
manual or automatic recovery disposition; and each recipe uses tooling rated
for the modeled operation class.Example architecture
PLM/MES recipe + PLC interface dictionaries + safety design
|
controlled reconciliation
v
MLTTDB candidate baseline
|
proof assistant verification
v
change-control evidence and codegen inputs
|
PLC/robot offline validation -> site release
Engineering adapters map PLM recipe identifiers, MES product variants, and controls tags to a reviewed vocabulary. MLTTDB stores the resulting typed source rows and can orchestrate their verification. A separate generator may consume an accepted baseline, but its output is independently reviewed, compiled, simulated, and commissioned against the actual PLC and robot programs. No proof-language record is sent directly to an actuator.
Representative typed artifacts
EquipmentCapabilityandToolingCompatibilitycatalogues.RecipePhasewith abstract entry conditions, commanded operation class, and completion indication.PermissiveGroup, distinguishing process permissives from safety-rated protective functions.HandshakeContractfor producer/consumer request, acknowledge, timeout, and abort states.RecoveryPlanand proofs of phase sequencing, interlock coverage, exclusive mode selection, and recovery completeness.
Checks and evidence
Potential benefits
Deployment boundary
04 Tool-using AI agent protocol-assurance service Explore pattern
Operational context
Why MLTTDB fits
Example architecture
tool registry + IAM policy + workflow definitions
|
normalization and owner review
v
MLTTDB protocol catalogue <--- proof-owned state model
|
verification API / release CI
v
approved policy-bundle digest
|
agent orchestrator + runtime policy engine + audit pipeline
External connectors reconcile canonical tool, principal, and data-class identifiers. The term store retains reviewed proof-language policy records, while the proof assistant evaluates protocol invariants. CI publishes a result bound to the proposed bundle. The orchestrator and policy engine load only a separately authorized bundle and enforce decisions using authenticated runtime context; an observability pipeline records actual actions.
Representative typed artifacts
PrincipalRole,ToolCapability, andEffectClass, including read, mutation, external communication, and irreversible-effect distinctions.ProtocolStateandTransition, with initiator, preconditions, effect, next state, and failure state.ApprovalRequirementandDelegationScope, tied to an external IAM policy identity rather than invented by the agent.CompensationContractfor operations whose effects can be reversed or explicitly cannot be reversed.- A
ProtocolBundleManifestaggregate term, reconciled to the tool registry, IAM-policy snapshot, and exported row UUIDs, materializing the transition graph used for bundle-wide reachability and privilege checks. - Proofs of least modeled privilege, approval-before-effect, failure closure, and absence of forbidden state paths.
Checks and evidence
Potential benefits
Deployment boundary
These read-only, pan-and-zoom models expose three abstraction levels for each workflow. They are explanatory examples, not live operational or decision systems.
Agentic Change Executor
About this workflow
This example represents an autonomous agent carrying out a production infrastructure change under bounded authority. It separates a requested outcome from the plan, approval, execution capability, rollout observations, and final acceptance. That separation is essential when an agent can call deployment, configuration, identity, or cloud-management tools: an apparently reasonable objective must not become permission to alter unspecified resources.
The normal campaign begins by parsing the desired outcome, prohibited effects, target resources, dependency boundaries, success measures, and rollback conditions. The proposed sequence of tool calls is exercised against a read-only snapshot, checked for permissions and resource invariants, and revised if targets or ordering are ambiguous. Authorization is then bound to the verified plan digest and expressed through scoped, expiring capabilities. Execution proceeds in bounded batches, with health signals, invariant checks, checkpoints, and observations recorded after each batch. Outcome verification compares the observed environment with success criteria, probes dependencies for regressions, and assembles a trace from intent to result. Only a verified outcome closes as accepted.
The machine makes failure containment explicit. An invalid simulation returns for replanning before authority is issued. A breached invariant during rollout, or a regression found during outcome verification, enters rollback recovery. Unused capabilities are revoked, the latest verified checkpoint is restored, and recovery invariants are checked. The campaign may return for reauthorization and resume, or close after a verified rollback. These controls matter to platform engineering and change-management teams because they limit blast radius, prevent approval drift after a plan changes, and preserve evidence that the actions actually performed were the actions reviewed.
Layer 1 — Change campaign stages
Layer 2 — Authorization and rollout protocols
Layer 3 — Tool-level actions
Inspection Drone Operation
About this workflow
This example describes an unmanned inspection sortie from planning through evidence closure. The aircraft must collect usable sensor data while staying inside approved airspace, standoff, altitude, weather, control-link, and energy limits. The machine frames those limits as operational protocols rather than relying on the autopilot to make an unconstrained best effort.
The planned path begins with waypoints and inspection objectives, together with the applicable airspace, daylight, weather, and site constraints. Launch clearance verifies the command link, return-position fix, battery reserve, geofence, and approved flight plan before arming. The aircraft then follows its authorized altitude corridor to the asset, continuously tracking link quality, traffic, obstacles, and remaining energy. On station it stabilizes at each viewpoint, acquires the required imagery or measurements, checks data quality, and maintains its prescribed standoff. A planned return selects a route that fits the current energy margin, verifies that the landing zone is clear, and ends with touchdown and disarm confirmation. Closure reconciles the collected dataset against the inspection plan.
An aircraft is never assumed to continue simply because it is airborne. A rejected clearance returns the sortie for replanning, while cancellation before launch can close it without flight. Transit and inspection anomalies enter a common emergency response where link loss, worsening weather, navigation error, traffic conflict, or low energy is classified. Depending on the remaining safety envelope, the response can hold, return, divert, land, or resume the inspection after bounded recovery. The autonomous decision and any remote-pilot intervention are retained. These controls matter to UAS operators because a valid inspection objective does not override airspace authorization or safe recovery, and because flight logs must explain why the aircraft deviated from the original plan.
Layer 1 — Flight operation phases
Layer 2 — Airborne safety protocols
Layer 3 — Autopilot actions
Autonomous Warehouse Fulfillment
About this workflow
This example represents a robotic pick-and-deliver mission in a shared warehouse. It treats the mission as more than motion between two coordinates: inventory custody, aisle reservations, payload limits, separation from people and equipment, and battery reserve must remain valid from dispatch through confirmed handoff. The machine therefore makes the operational authority given to the robot explicit and bounded.
The normal path starts when the warehouse control system validates a pick task, destination slot, robot allocation, and payload assignment. Route authorization then checks aisle geofences, traffic reservations, load limits, and energy margin before issuing an approved route envelope. During autonomous execution the robot localizes against the current map, navigates the reserved segments, responds to obstacles, and secures the requested unit. At the destination, handoff verification scans both payload and location identifiers and waits for inventory acknowledgement before closing the mission and reconciling the stock movement.
The return paths are as important as the happy path. An infeasible route goes back for task revision rather than being dispatched. A route, grasp, proximity, or low-energy fault moves execution into a safe-stop recovery state while payload custody is preserved. A mismatched destination or inventory scan is quarantined instead of being accepted as delivery. Recovery can lead to a newly authorized route, a supervised handoff, or closure as an unrecoverable mission. These controls matter because a locally plausible robot action can still violate fleet traffic rules, lose chain of custody, or create an inventory discrepancy. Recording invariant checks and operator interventions also gives operations and safety teams a usable incident trail.